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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Plaintiff sets forth the following determinative 
rules. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence• 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
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SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111) 
Kearns Building, Suite 721 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7858 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* 
MARGARET B. HALL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND 
CONTROL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
* 
Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. Hall") submits 
the following reply to the Brief Of Appellee. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Brief Of Appellee is for the most part rambling and 
incoherent and appears to be aimed more at confusing the issues 
than at illuminating them. Accordingly, Mrs. Hall's reply will 
focus on attempting to bring some clarity to the confusion which 
Appellee has created. 
II. POINT I OF APPELLEE'S "ARGUMENT" MAKES NO SENSE AT ALL. 
Appellee begins point I of its Argument as follows: 
One fundamental problem with [Mrs. Hall's] theory of 
this case is that she never plead that [Appellee] was 
the alter ego of John [i.e., Appellee's President and 
sole shareholder]. Judge Rokich did comment on that 
failure, but quite properly refused to allow it to 
influence his decision. All of her arguments transpose 
[Appellee] for John; however, she neglected to either 
* * * 
* 
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plead that theory or to present sufficient evidence to 
support it. Margaret did not anywhere plead that 
[Appellees] was merely the alter ego of John, nor did 
she ask the lower court to pierce the corporate veil. 
Brief Of Appellee at pages 8-9. 
The short answer to this transparent red herring is that not 
only has Mrs. Hall never plead any alter ego theory in this case, 
but she has never cirgued that that theory is applicable. It 
clearly is not.1 Further, contrary to Appellee's nonsensical 
subheading, there is nothing in Mrs. Hall's Opening Brief which 
even remotely suggests that this is "an alter ego case". 
Appellee next contends that "The consideration which [Mrs. 
Hall] claims to have given might have been arguably consideration 
to John, but not to [Appellee]." 
Appellee is apparently referring to Mrs. Hall's claim that 
the consideration which she gave in exchange for Appellee's 
promises under the so-called "Employment Agreement" consisted of 
her return promise to forego any right to alimony which she might 
otherwise have had in connection with the divorce proceedings 
simultaneously taking place between herself and Appellee's 
President, John A. Hall (hereinafter referred to as the "Divorce 
Action"). Although not explicitly stated, Appellee is evidently 
arguing that Mrs. Hall's promise to forego alimony could not 
constitute consideration for any return promise from Appellee 
1
 The only reference to "alter ego" in this entire case 
was made by the trial judge during closing argument: "I don't 
know why somebody didn't bring that up. Alter ego." (Trial Tr. 
p. 153, line 20) Mrs. Hall can only speculate as to what the 
trial judge was referring. 
2 
because Appellee received no benefit from Mrs. Hall's promise.2 
Appellee's argument reveals a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the nature of consideration. In Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 
764 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah App. 1988), this Court recognized that: 
"A generally accepted definition of consideration is 
that a legal detriment has been bargained for and 
exchanged for a promise .... [and that] there is 
consideration whenever a promisor receives a benefit or 
where the promisee suffers a detriment, however 
slight." 
(Citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Clearly, Mrs. Hall's promise to forego her claim to alimony 
in the Divorce Action constitutes a "detriment". See, e.g., 
Gorgoza v. Utah State Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 
1976)(agreement not to challenge condemnation action constitutes 
adequate consideration regardless of benefit to promisee). 
Accordingly, Appellee's promises under the Employment Agreement 
were supported by adequate consideration. 
Appellee next argues that Mrs. Hall's promise to forego 
alimony could not constitute consideration because she had 
"entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to her marriage to 
John which provided that in the event of divorce she would not 
ask for, nor be entitled to alimony." Brief Of Appellee at page 
9. 
2
 The trial judge also expressed his opinion during 
closing argument that there had been a failure of consideration 
because Appellee did not receive any benefit from Mrs. Hall's 
promise to forego alimony. (Trial Tr. p. 154, lines 12 thru 24) 
3 
This argument is not well taken,3 Everyone involved in the 
Divorce Action, including Mr. Hall's attorney (who, not 
coincidentally, also drafted the Employment Agreement on behalf 
of Appellee) knew that Mrs. Hall vigorously disputed the validity 
of the antenuptial agreement.4 Accordingly, Mrs. Hall's promise 
to forego her right to challenge that agreement provided adequate 
consideration for Appellee's return promises regardless of any 
benefit received by Appellee. Ggrgoza, 553 P.2d at 416. 
Gorgoza is directly on point with the case at bar. That 
case involved a breach of contract claim in which the plaintiff 
sought to recover for damages to its resort property resulting 
from the construction of highway 1-80. The contract arose in 
connection with a prior condemnation action in which the 
plaintiff alleged that it had "agree[d] to an order of immediate 
occupancy of part of [its] land to be taken and used in the 
construction of the* highway ... in exchange for a promise that 
certain provisions concerning the construction of the road and 
access to [its] property be incorporated into the order." 553 
P.2d at 414. 
When sued for its subsequent breach of the agreement, the 
3
 During closing argument, Judge Rokich specifically 
advised Mrs. Hall's counsel that he did not consider the 
antenuptial agreement to be of any relevance and, therefore, that 
Mrs. Hall's counsel did not "have to argue about that." (Trial 
Tr. p. 149, lines 20-21) 
4
 Mr. Hall's attorney testified not only that Mrs. Hall 
did not consider the antenuptial agreement to be enforceable, but 
that "She said they're going to go to the Supreme Court and fight 
tooth and nail." (Trial Tr. p. 94, line 23 thru p. 95, line 2) 
4 
defendant argued that the agreement was unenforceable for lack of 
consideration because "upon the filing of the condemnation 
proceeding it was entitled as a matter of law to take plaintiff's 
property and have an order of immediate occupancy." 553 P.2d at 
415-16. 
In other words, as in the case at bar, the defendant argued 
that because the plaintiff had merely agreed to something it was 
already under a legal obligation to do, the agreement was 
unenforceable for lack of consideration. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Defendant's argument, holding 
that: 
by its compliance with the Road Commission's request 
[the plaintiff] forewent its right to challenge and to 
have a hearing on those matters. It matters not that 
this may or may not have proved to be of much actual 
value. Sufficiency of consideration is not necessarily 
measured in terms of money value equivalents. If one 
party asks for and receives something he would not 
otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is 
consideration. It is obvious that what was done here 
falls within that formula. 
553 P.2d at 416 (emphasis added). 
It is likewise obvious in the case at bar that, regardless 
of the validity of the antenuptial agreement, Mrs. Hall's promise 
to forego her right to challenge its validity and to seek an 
award of alimony was adequate consideration for Appellee's return 
promises. 
III. SINCE OBTAINING NEW COUNSEL AND FILING HER AMENDED 
COMPLAINT, THE THEORY OF MRS. HALL'S CASE HAS NEVER CHANGED. 
The thread of point II of Appellee's Argument is difficult 
to follow, adorned as it is with unfounded statements of fact and 
5 
unsupported and vague pronouncements of law. There is one theme 
that Mrs. Hall will address, however; and that is Appellee's 
recurrent allegation that Mrs. Hall has continuously changed the 
theory of her case. 
For example, Appellee asserts that: 
From Margaret's initial amendment of her complaint in 
1990 until more than half way through the trial of this 
matter, she claimed that the employment agreement was 
in reality an agreement on behalf of the company to pay 
alimony on behalf of John. It is extremely significant 
that she did not claim until very late in the 
proceedings that the agreement was in reality a 
settlement agreement to pay its entire benefits 
regardless of whether she worked. 
At closing argument, Margaret asked the court to 
reform the agreement to read as a settlement agreement 
to require [Appellee], not her former husband, to make 
a lump sum payment, payable in installments to Margaret 
whether she ever worked for the company or not. 
Brief of Appellee at page 13. 
It is telling that Appellee fails to identify anything in 
the record which supports this assertion. Instead, Appellee 
stretches beyond recognition 
... a colloquy between the court and plaintiff's 
counsel, [in which] Mr. Mitchell told the court that 
the agreement was neither an employment agreement 
(Plaintiff's original claim) nor an alimony agreement 
(Plaintiff's amended claim), but "it's a settlement 
agreement." 
Brief Of Appellee at page 13. 
The "colloquy"1 to which Appellee refers is found in the 
Trial Transcript at page 150, line 1 thru page 151, line 17, in 
which Mrs. Hall's counsel responds to the trial judge's request 
for clarification as to whether "this is an alimony agreement or 
an employment agreement?": 
6 
Mr. Mitchell: It's an agreement to pay Mrs. Hall ... a 
thousand dollars a month to forego any right she might 
have to alimony. 
There was clearly a dispute as to whether Mrs. 
[Hall] was entitled to alimony. There was an 
antenuptial agreement. The parties disputed the ... 
validity of that agreement. They went in --
The Court: So you're saying this is a settlement 
agreement? 
Mr. Mitchell: It's a settlement agreement. 
The Court: Fine. 
Mr. Mitchell: You can call it alimony. You can call it 
a settlement. You can call it alimony and a 
settlement. It is an agreement by the defendant 
corporation to pay Margaret Hall a thousand dollars 
Tper month! in exchange for her agreement not to pursue 
alimony in the divorce decree. 
(Emphasis added). 
In response to further questioning by the trial judge, Mrs. 
Hall's counsel reiterated Mrs. Hall's position at page 154 of the 
Trial Transcript: 
Mr. Mitchell: ... It was [an] agreement [that] she 
would receive a thousand dollars a month if she would 
forego her right to alimony. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Mitchell: Now, if you say that's the payment of 
alimony, I guess that's fine if that's the way you see 
it. But it was an agreement to forego alimony. 
Alimony has separate and distinct legal rights that go 
with it, and if you agree to forego it for a thousand 
dollars a month, there's adequate consideration. 
In short, Appellee's contention that Mrs. Hall changed the 
theory of her case and ff[a]t closing argument, [] asked the court 
to reform the agreement to read as a settlement agreement ..." is 
baseless. Since retaining replacement counsel and amending her 
Complaint, the theory of Mrs. Hall's case has never wavered. 
7 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF "PARTIAL INTEGRATION" IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
In Point III of its Argument, Appellee contends that the 
Employment Agreement: 
... was clearly at a minimum a partially integrated 
contract. Margaret's claim has never been that the 
employment agreement was not at least a partially 
integrated agreement, otherwise she would have been 
faced with a myriad of nasty alternatives, e.g., 
"Statute of Frauds" and Res Judicata. 
Brief Of Appellee at page 15. 
Again, Appellee fails to explain what it means by this 
curious contention. There was certainly no finding of fact or 
conclusion of law that the Employment Agreement was at least 
"partially integrated". Further, Mrs. Hall's claim that the 
parties never intended that she would go to work for Appellee 
under the Employment Agreement is obviously inconsistent with any 
acknowledgement that the agreement is partially integrated. 
Likewise specious is Appellee's contention that Mrs. Hall would 
somehow be faced with Statute of Frauds and res judicata problems 
unless the agreement were at least partially integrated. 
Appellee also makes a number of misrepresentations in point 
III of its Argument which Mrs. Hall believes need to be 
addressed. 
First, Appelle.e misrepresents that 
"Mr. Ennenga [the attorney that drafted the Employment 
Agreement on behalf of Appellee and who also 
represented Mr. Hall in the Divorce Action] was 
emphatic, and despite persistent cross examination by 
Margaret's counsel, did not waiver (sic) on the point 
that the employment agreement was not entered into upon 
consideration of Margaret waiving her claimed right 
to alimony." 
8 
Brief Of Appellee at page 18 (Appellee's emphasis). 
In point of fact, on direct examination Mr. Ennenga did 
unequivocally testify on Appellee's behalf that the Employment 
Agreement was not entered into by Appellee in consideration for 
Mrs. Hall's agreement to forego her claim to alimony in the 
Divorce Action. (Trial Tr. p. 118, lines 10-13) However, on 
cross-examination, Mr. Ennenga not only wavered on that point, he 
did a complete flip-flop, testifying that he did not know one way 
or the other whether Appellee's promises under the Employment 
Agreement were made in exchange for Mrs. Hall's promise to forego 
her claim to alimony. (Trial Tr. p. 137, line 14 thru p. 138, 
line 3) Mr. Ennenga also testified that, even though it was he 
that drafted the Employment Agreement, the terms of the agreement 
were neither negotiated nor discussed in his presence (Trial Tr. 
p. 138, line 3-21), that the terms of the agreement had been 
arrived at by the parties prior to his involvement (Trial Tr. p. 
138, lines 9-16), and that he merely "put in there what [he] was 
told to put in there " (Trial Tr. p. 137, line 11 thru p. 138, 
line 3) 
In short, Mr. Ennenga's testimony with respect to the terms 
of the Employment Agreement, including the consideration 
bargained for by the parties, was anything but "emphatic" and 
unwavering. 
Appellee also misrepresents that Mrs. Hall failed "to advise 
the court that the statement by Judge Rokich [i.e., that 'I 
believe this is nothing more than an alimony agreement.'] was at 
9 
the close of Plaintiff's evidence." Brief of Appellee at page 17 
(Appellee's emphasis). That is simply not true. To the 
contrary, Mrs. Hall specifically advised the Court that Judge 
Rokich's statements were made "When Defendant moved for dismissal 
after Mrs. Hall rested her case ..." Appellant's Opening Brief 
at page 16. 
Finally, Appellee attempts to belatedly rehabilitate Mr. 
Hall's preposterous trial testimony by offering that "The fact 
that [Mr. Hall'] meunory of events which had transpired ten years 
previously became confused upon cross-examination proves 
nothing." Brief Of Appellee at page 19. Exactly what Appellee 
is referring to is unclear. What is clear is that Mr. Hall's 
trial testimony was in most relevant respects identical to his 
previous deposition testimony. (Trial Tr. p. 66, line 4 thru p. 
69, line 16; p.86, line 23 thru p. 88, line 25; and p. 103, line 
5 thru p. 105, line 24) Mr. Hall's memory was not confused; to 
the contrary/ he has steadfastly maintained his preposterous 
fabrications throughout this litigation. 
V. MR. TURLEY'S TESTIMONY WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN RELEVANT AND HE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY. 
In point IV of its Argument, Appellee first contends that 
the trial court's disallowance of the testimony of Brent Turley 
was proper because the "Turley episode ... was remote in time 
from the facts of this case, having occurred some five years 
previously." Brief Of Appellee at pages 20-21. According to 
Appellee, the the fact that the "Turley episode" occurred some 
five years earlier lessened its probative value to such an extent 
10 
that it had become irrelevant. 
The short answer to this contention is that the trial 
judge's ruling on the admissability of Mr. Turley's testimony had 
nothing to do with remoteness. The specific ruling was that: 
"The objection is sustained. You've got to show more 
than just one occasion. That may be a method under 
which he operates, but nevertheless I don't see where 
it's relevant to this case. 
(Trial Tr. p. 61, lines 2-6) 5 
Even if the trial judge's ruling had been based upon 
remoteness, however, Appellee fails to offer any explanation as 
to why the passage of five years would have had any effect on the 
probative value of Mr. Turley's testimony, let alone explain how 
it would render the testimony completely irrelevant. Appellee 
also fails to recognize that a trial judge does not have 
discretion to exclude relevant evidence so easily. 
In Utah, "[a]11 relevant evidence is admissible ..." Rule 
402, Utah Rules of Evidence. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable ... 
than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, U.R.E. 
Mr. Turley's testimony would have been that Mr. Hall had 
attempted to use an employment contract with his company 
(containing terms virtually identical to those at issue in the 
5
 This ruling is particularly puzzling. If Mr. Turley's 
testimony would have made it more probable that Mr. Hall had a 
method of operating whereby he used employment contracts with his 
company as consideration for his personal obligations, the 
testimony would clearly have been relevant. See Rule 401, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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case at bar, including that Mr. Turley would not be required to 
go to work for Mr. Hall's company) as the down-payment on his 
purchase of Mr. Turley's home. This testimony would clearly have 
had a tendency to make it more probable that the consideration 
given by Mrs. Hall in the case at bar for Appellee's obligations 
under the so-called Employment Agreement was not her promise to 
go to work for Appellee, but, rather, was her promise to forego 
her claim to alimony in the Divorce Action. 
By definition, then, Mr. Turley's testimony would have been 
relevant to the adequacy of consideration issue. Accordingly, 
Mr. Turleyfs testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 402, 
U.R.E. 
Notwithstanding its admissability, however, the trial judge 
could have excluded Mr. Turley's testimony under Rule 403, 
U.R.E., if he had determined that its probative value was 
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Terry v. Zions Co-op. 
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 1979). The trial 
judge made no such determination. Instead, he simply ruled that 
the proffered testimony was not relevant. 
The very caselaw upon which Appellee relies demonstrates 
that the trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing Mr. 
Turley to testify. 
In Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 
12 
~" ' ----- * %m Court: recognized that before a trial judge 
may exercise *" > ^sr^r,^. .-* ^ xciurio ^ jlevant evidence he must 
engage 
,:e r tit? decision to exclude relevant evidence 
5 a delicate weighing process, the extent of u w 
pxui .^e value of the evidence must be considered by 
the trial judge, and, where "the probative value of 
offered evidence is not great, any such probative vaxue 
may be outweighed by considerations such as those of 
surprise, unfairness, confusion of the jury, and 
prolonging of a trial " [Citation oini tted] 
605 P. 2d at 323, f in. HI, 
"If i t* T O i i | I H I I I I l l I I in I f l h « l . i in I in I I i lulu )m I lit h i In i f i l l i S P i l in I ' l l 
discretion in the case beioxe i I: because: 
the trial judge took into consideration the delay and 
confusion that would,result from a re-trial of the 
prior conviction, the remoteness of the prior 
act, and the tendency the proffered evidence would 
have to mislead and prejudice the jury. By considering 
these factors and basing his decision upon conclusions 
drawn from these considerations, the trial judge did 
not abuse his discretion 
605 I » 2d at 323 (emphasis added). 
T h u s , i i :::: t ox :i 3 5 m i i ' i l ii I 1 1 ii I | md i j t» t , i i i n | a ( j t » 1111 ii Mi l l 11 i l l t» 
weighing process" belore he may propeiIy exercise his discretion 
to exclude 1 el evant evidence, but, il he *s f * •-x'" *de such 
evi dence ; on the basi s oi rem< >tene; >s, 3 
probative val ue i s lessened to such an exteir * * at , t is 
'""outweighed by considerations such as those of surprise, 
urn airness, confusion c f 1:1 w jui y\ iiml pi 111 inn 11 IHJ . " 
P .2d at 323, i:i: :m 30 
ft s i nd :i ::::a ted abo\ e 1 « MIH It <»1 it-»s• 1 w 1 •. 1 it I 1 m » b a s i 1 , I o r t h e 
t r i a l judge's 1: 111 ing on the 1 naclmlssaijili ty oi ill . luriey s 
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testimony. However, even if it had been the basis for his 
ruling, the trial judge obviously did not engage in the requisite 
"delicate weighing process" to arrive at a determination that the 
remoteness of the prior incident lessened its probative value to 
such an extent that it was outweighed by other considerations 
"such as those of surprise, unfairness, confusion of the jury, 
and prolonging of a trial." Id. Accordingly, under Terry, Mrs. 
Hall submits that the asserted remoteness of the prior incident 
cannot provide a basis for upholding the trial judge's ruling 
that Mr. Turley's testimony was inadmissable. 
The Terry decision is also of particular significance due to 
the fact that there was only one prior incident at issue in that 
case. In the case at bar, the only explanation given by the 
trial judge for his decision to exclude Mr. Turley's testimony 
was that "you've got to show more than one other occasion." As 
confirmed by the facts of Terry. that only "one other occasion" 
was involved is not a critical factor. See also, Leger 
Construction, Inc. v Roberts. Inc.. 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1976)(evidence relating to another similar construction job); 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 347 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1959)(evidence related to a prior sale of real property); 
McCormick On Evidence § 198 (4th ed.)("[I]t seems clear that 
contracts of a party with third persons may show the party's ... 
course of dealing and thus supply useful insights into the terms 
of the present agreement. Indeed, even if there are but one or 
two such contracts, they may be useful evidence."). Accordingly, 
14 
Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that Mr. TurleyVs testimony shoul d 
have been allowed regardless of the fact that it involved only 
OIM:.' I.) t l i e Z "I 
• A p p e l l e e n e x t a r g u e s t h a t Rule 404(b) of t h e Utah Ru le s of 
Evidence p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r upho 1 ci i nq the? t r i a l j m d q e ' s 
d i s a l l o w a n c e uf Hi , 1 IIJ li»«, "s UiuLiinuir> I'lus a rgument i s 
f r i v o l o u s , RuJe 404! till d e a l s s o l e l y w i t h " c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e " , 
±. i Hi'v i df iico inl lit he r iirtii o f f e r e d In ' p i n e Hie c h a r a c t e r id a 
p e r s o n i n u i d e i tu lAuwi lllhuil lie a c t e d in u u i i l u r n u l y t h e r e w i t h " 
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Finally, Appellee asserts that even if I he trial jurtqe's 
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and (2) that because this was a non-jury trial "it cannot be said 
that the Turley episode went unnoticed in wa.1 not qiven 1 he 
weiqlil mi 1 denei vei I Id u f ill Appe J Ih ie .id petje 11 il hppe 1 I ee " "» 
emphasis). 
With respect to the former argument, as demonstrated above, 
6
 Even if Mr, Turleyfs testimony 1 lad been offered to 
prove Mr I la 11 f s character, however, Rule 404(b) would not have 
been an obstacle because that rule specifically provides that 
character evidence is admissible for the purpose of proving 
"intent". See State v. Brown, 577 P. 2d 135 "(Utah 1978) (single 
unrelated offense involving similar criminal activity by 
defendant proper! y admitted as evi dence of defendantf s i ntei I t:). 
] 5 
of the "three other witnesses who gave direct testimony" (i.e., 
Mr. Hall, Mr. Hall's attorney, Mr. Ennenga, and Appellant), two 
of the witnesses (Mr. Hall and Appellant) gave contradictory 
testimony. The third witness (Mr. Ennenga) testified that he did 
not know one way or the other whether Appellee's promises under 
the so-called Employment Agreement were made in exchange for Mrs. 
Hall's promise to forego her claim to alimony. (Trial Tr. p. 137, 
line 14 thru p. 138, line 3). Mr. Ennenga further testified 
that, even though it was he that drafted the Employment 
Agreement, the terms of the agreement were neither negotiated nor 
discussed in his presence (Trial Tr. p. 138, lines 3-21), that 
the terms of the agreement had been arrived at by the parties 
prior to his involvement (Trial Tr. p. 138, lines 9-16), and that 
he merely "put in there what [he] was told to put in there ..." 
(Trial Tr. p. 137, line 11 thru p. 138, line 3). 
Under the circumstances, Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that 
Mr. Turley's testimony would have been extremely important 
corroboration in what is essentially a swearing match between 
herself and Mr. Hall. 
Likewise unpersuasive is Appellee's suggestion that Mrs. 
Hall's proffer of the general substance of Mr. Turley's testimony 
was sufficient to render harmless the trial judge's refusal to 
allow Mr. Turley to testify in person. In a case such as this, 
where credibility is of such obvious importance, proffered 
testimony is simply not an adequate substitute for the real 
thing. Otherwise, why not conduct the entire trial by proffer. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs, Hal 1 i espectfu.1 ly requests that the District Court's 
11 ud< : |iiH.2i 11 1 HI « J e v*» i ! t«.M I a i :tcl I I  in 11 1 .111s i in "i l : i o i I b e i: e i i i d i n i u d \ 11 I 11 
instructions for further proceedings consistent with this Court: 
decision. 
DATED til lis X y ' day of January " 
Sfcott B. Mitchell 
Attorney for Appellant 
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